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A small, but growing, number of states have legislation that protects 
the conscience of parents by allowing them to opt out of teaching practices and 
content.1 Most notably, HB 542 in New Hampshire allows parents to opt their 
children out of the teaching of any material or through any pedagogical style 
that they find “objectionable” to their conscience, though parents are not 
required to provide a reason for objecting and their identities can be shielded 
from public record if they make such a request. Also, at the expense of the 
parent, the teacher or school must construct an alternative curriculum that is 
suitable to the parent while still meeting state requirements in the relevant 
subject area.  
Related laws in other states include Kentucky, whose longstanding 
Bekner amendment and Bill of Rights Section 5 guarantee that no man shall be 
“compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously 
opposed;”2 Texas, which allows parents to opt out of any class or activity that 
“conflicts with a parent’s religious or moral beliefs;”3 and Missouri, which 
recently decided that no student shall be compelled to take part in any 
“academic assignments or educational presentations that violate his or her 
religious beliefs”—beliefs that admittedly typically come from parents.4  
These laws should be understood within their judicial context. For 
while the courts have consistently upheld the right of parents to control the 
upbringing of their children, in part through choosing a school for them, “they 
do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches 
their child.”5 Despite this, parents have repeatedly relied on the Yoder and 
Mozert decisions to call for opt-out procedures in their schools, most notably 
beginning in the 1970s with sex education. More recently, rather than rely on 
judicial decisions after-the-fact, parents have become active in shaping 
                                                
1 Thank you to my graduate assistant, Amy Rector-Aranda for her help in preparing this 
manuscript. 
2 Kentucky Bill of Rights, Section 5, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/rr137.pdf. See also 
James C. Carper and Thomas C. Hunt, The Dissenting Tradition in American Education 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 190. 
3 KJ Dell’Antonia, “When Parents Can Opt Out of School Curriculums,” Motherlode 
(blog), New York Times, January 17, 2012, 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/. 
4 Valerie Strauss, “The Real Wall of Separation in Public Schools,” The Answer Sheet 
(blog), Washington Post, September 6, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/.  
5 Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005), 395–96. 
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legislation that allows them greater control over the content and delivery of the 
curriculum, as was the case with the New Hampshire law. 
These laws challenge educational philosophers to reconsider the 
definition of conscience, including its understanding as an educational product 
and its role in shaping curriculum. In this paper, I ask: What does conscience 
mean within the context of school curriculum and how is conscience itself best 
developed? How is enacting the conscience of parents destructive to the public 
ends of education as well as the private consciences of their children? I will 
tease out the seemingly paradoxical claim that a commitment to the liberty of 
individual consciences is a commitment to the public good. Within this 
understanding, individuals are able to flourish not when they are shielded from 
all conflicting views, but when they are exposed to and engage with a 
multiplicity of views as members of a public concerned with communal 
wellbeing and problem solving. A conscience claim may then be seen as a call 
to negotiation and exchange, rather than a personal withdrawal.6  
I will question whether the laws rightfully enable the parent to 
safeguard one pre-selected vision of the good life over the child’s opportunity 
to learn about multiple and conflicting visions. I will examine the impact of 
classrooms being deprived of certain viewpoints due to conscience legislation, 
especially those that run counter to mainstream content. Finally, I will consider 
how this move jeopardizes future production of a deeply pluralistic public 
capable of interacting across differences of belief. 
Defining Conscience 
Conscience is commonly understood to be an internal personal 
conviction held by an individual and often wielded against, or in spite of, the 
outside world. It is an “inward domain,” which John Stuart Mill believes 
contains “liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment of all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or 
theological.”7 Freedom of conscience is protected in America as central not 
only to our tradition of rugged individualism and the pursuit of happiness, but 
to the very definition of a person him or herself, as one who is distinct from 
others and holds his or her own views independently.8 Conscience, however, 
should not be so understood.9 Framing it as such and reinforcing it through 
                                                
6 Paul Strohm, Conscience: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 88. 
7 John Stuart Mill from On Liberty (1859), quoted in Paul Strohm, Conscience: A Very 
Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 56. 
8 Roger Williams, who substantially influenced the views of settlers and early American 
religion, viewed conscience as the man himself. See Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of 
Conscience (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 52.  
9 As pointed out to me by a reviewer, Josh Corngold wisely recognizes the potential 
problems of conflating two distinct concepts in ways that reduce the negative aspects of 
a concept or highlight the positive aspects of another interpretation. It is possible that 
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laws impacting our schools affirms not only a problematic understanding of the 
concept, but also invites serious problems to public life and education.  
Beginning with its linguistic roots, conscience is better understood in a 
collective and relational sense as shared knowledge:10 “The word is the direct 
descendant and the exact cognate of the Latin conscientia, which is the word 
for knowledge, scientia, to which is added the prefix with. Thus it means to 
know along with others.”11 Conscience, as normed and “reflexive judgment 
about things that matter”12 is something we develop through interactions with 
others, hold alongside others, and engage in ways that impact others. It is not 
merely an internal construct and is certainly not one that we develop or enact 
only within a sealed off, private realm, as suggested by more common 
interpretations of the concept.  
Rather as Robert Vischer rightly argues, “Conscience, by its very 
nature, directs our gaze outward, to sources of formation, to communities of 
discernment, and to venues for expression.”13 It is false to believe the 
conscience is narrowly internal. Our conscience does not generate and process 
ideas solely on its own or without external influence. Instead, conscience 
pushes us to engage with the world around us, to reflect on our position within 
it, and to construct ways to disseminate our views effectively within it.  
Conscience is shaped by membership in one’s community or family, 
and through the acquisition of norms as one learns about its history, beliefs, and 
practices.14 This is not to say that conscience is merely conformity to cultural 
norms or beliefs. Rather, conscience entails processing, questioning, and 
challenging those received norms and beliefs while constructing and testing out 
alternatives alongside others. 
Membership in a significant group is key to conscience, and it is the 
group that often becomes the benefactor and object of conscience, for “it would 
have to be membership of a sort that makes reflexive judgment possible, a 
membership in the light of which one can critically judge one’s own 
performance and that of others.”15 It is our communities and our memberships 
                                                                                                        
some of my work here verges on this in terms of defining conscience, though I do my 
best to show otherwise. See Josh Corngold, “Egregiously Conflated Concepts,” in 
Philosophy of Education 2005, ed. Kenneth R. Howe (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 2005). 
10 Thomas Hobbes argued for this relational understanding of conscience in his 
Leviathan (1651). 
11 Richard G. Stevens, “Conscience and Politics,” Teaching Political Science 11, no. 4 
(1984): 171. 
12 Thomas F. Green, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience. (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 21. 
13 Robert Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 4. 
14 Green, Voices, 24 and 69. 
15 Ibid., 69. 
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within them that shape not only the content of our beliefs, but also encourage 
us to exercise them for the good or improvement of the community to which 
we belong. Or, in the words of philosopher of education Thomas Green, 
“Conscience is private only in the odd and impoverished sense in which pain is 
private, but conscience, nonetheless, is shaped only within some membership 
and for the sake of life within the membership so formed.”16  
In this regard, conscience is a concern of education insofar as schools 
are tasked with improving individuals’ judgment of societal norms in 
preparation for their functioning as citizens within that society. While not 
reducible to civic engagement or interchangeable with political dissent, which 
entails an intentional, inquiry-based action that extends beyond the realm of 
knowledge construction and use via conscience, conscience is a faculty for 
engaging with others in one’s community.17 It should be used to build, 
exchange, and challenge collective knowledge.  
Admittedly there may be profound moments of incommensurability 
between ourselves and others. Indeed parents may find the content being taught 
in schools utterly opposed to their worldviews or moral beliefs. Some may even 
want to protect their children from the pressures of conforming to beliefs so 
counter to those of their family through the process of assimilation and group 
think often fueled in our schools. Sometimes these responses are seen as too 
exceptional, as if the parents hold strange views that should not be 
accommodated by the schools, and in some cases, they may be. But in others, 
such a response may be a deeply felt and rationally justified reaction to 
incorrect or unjust content, content perhaps suggested by a school board or 
teacher who may actually be the one holding the extreme or wrongheaded 
view. This situation is perhaps akin to some parents in Texas who strongly 
reacted to the state’s reworking of the history standards just a few years ago, 
including changes that some saw as racist or harming the historical account of 
America. Some wanted to remove their children from the public schools so as 
to avoid such teachings. 
In the case of public schooling, conscience can help to guide our 
moral stands, aid us in constructing knowledge together, and give us a sense of 
which content is best suited for the curriculum, at times overcoming differences 
and in other times providing justification for them. Conscience claims, then, 
should be calls to negotiation and exchange, rather than bases for personal 
withdrawal.18 This view of conscience encourages even strongly opposed 
parents to keep their children in the classroom, learning about views different 
from their family, but also developing the skills to defend and alter those views 
in light of new material introduced. It encourages parents and children to 
actually engage more deeply with the counterviews they already hold while 
                                                
16 Ibid., 70. 
17 See my Teaching for Dissent: Citizenship Education and Political Activism (Boulder, 
CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012). 
18 On this point, see Strohm, Conscience, 88. 
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being exposed to those held more dominantly in the public school, thereby 
providing richer fodder for intellectual development and cultural 
understanding. Finally, such interactions can expand and diversify the 
conversations that form conscience in schools, preventing them from 
perpetuating problematic group think in homogeneous ways. However, what 
we see happening in HB 542 is that conscience is used to preclude interaction 
and the learning process, including learning the norms of one’s community and 
honing the necessary skills to judge them.  
Using HB 542 to petition objections based on parental conscience 
places children in a tenuous position within our attempts to balance the private 
and public natures of both education and conscience. While HB 542 conforms 
to the respect-conscience principle described by Martha Nussbaum, which 
protects the conscience of individuals operating in public domains,19 removing 
students from the classroom may prevent them from receiving a full and 
thorough education, and may undermine the goal of a rich and inclusive public. 
Further, its enactment treats conscience as solely a private matter that should be 
protected, rather than a public interest that should be nurtured, thereby not only 
confirming a faulty view of conscience, but also jeopardizing its development 
for the sake of both the personal and public good, as I will detail in the next 
section. 
Public Education and the Public Aspects of Conscience 
Certainly public schools fulfill important private needs, such as 
learning trades and skills that enable one to lead an economically viable life. 
But public schools bear the much larger burden of fulfilling the public interest, 
which includes cultivating citizens who can work together to solve social 
problems and construct mutually beneficial ways of communal life. These 
public interests, which bring together shared ways of living in political, 
cultural, and economic systems, are often grouped together into the notion of a 
public good. Though not always successful, the public school works to 
determine and enact this public good.20 In much the same way that conscience 
is formed through the process of normation within a community, and then later 
provides the skills of judgment needed to critique and improve that community, 
public schools enculturate children into accepted public ways of living, while 
keeping those ways open to debate and scrutiny as children learn about them.  
Philosophers of education Chris Higgins and Kathleen Knight 
Abowitz argue that the “public” of public schools is best seen as a verb—an 
action that entails creating common worlds, often arising from mutually-
beneficial problem solving or a bringing together of different viewpoints 
                                                
19 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, 22. 
20 Though I have chosen to use it here, Deron Boyles fairly convincingly troubles the 
term “the public good” in “The Privatized Public: Antagonism for Radical Democratic 
Politics in Schools?,” Educational Theory 61, no. 4 (2011): 434. 
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around common concerns.21 Creativity and teamwork is best developed in 
schools that engage children and community members with competing 
worldviews in dialogue. Such conversations and their overall aim of 
constructing the public good, however, are shortchanged when some children 
are removed due to parental objections. The public good thrives upon multiple 
voices coming together, including those that express minority views—the types 
of views that many parents are themselves trying to protect when they claim an 
objection to curriculum based on conscience. Those beliefs should be 
exchanged, enhanced, and challenged in the marketplace of ideas. A 
commitment to the liberty of conscience is a commitment to the public good, 
acknowledging that individuals are able to flourish not when they are shielded 
from all conflicting views, but when they are exposed to and engage with a 
multiplicity of views.22 Insofar as the public nature of schooling means actively 
working together to create common worlds, conscience is a key faculty for 
achieving that end. 
Americans increasingly seem to select friends, neighborhoods, and 
media that are already aligned with their views or experiences.23 Doing so 
produces a fragmented population with pockets of beliefs and practices. While 
not necessarily a bad thing, such isolation prevents people from coming 
together across differences, or from having their differing beliefs challenged. 
Distinct communities may forego the reflexive judgment of conscience that 
members employ to question or improve the beliefs and practices of the 
community, thereby risking their continued health. 
It is alarming that education laws further shield such exchanges by 
allowing parents to remove their children from material or ideas that counter 
their own beliefs. This is not only potentially harmful to the individual student 
and a thriving public, but it also subjects the curriculum to the risk of being 
watered down. Class material that is seen as potentially objectionable might be 
weeded out preemptively so as to avoid parental complaint, thereby removing 
complex and controversial curricula through which children come to appreciate 
nuance, difference, and debate around matters of importance in society. To 
achieve public as a verb and to work toward the public good, schools must 
introduce and engage a variety of worldviews.  
One important reason for exposing children to an array of worldviews 
is that such exposure provides children the opportunity to choose which life 
and beliefs seem most appealing to them. This, of course, is central to the idea 
of being an autonomous liberal chooser, a notion already well established in 
philosophy of education circles. While certainly a worthy goal on its own, it 
                                                
21 Chris Higgins and Kathleen Knight Abowitz, “What Makes a Public School Public? 
A Framework for Evaluating the Civic Substance of Schooling,” Educational Theory 
61, no. 4 (2011): 365. 
22 Vischer, Common Good, 45. 
23 Andy Frey and Michael Wilson, “The Resegregation of Public Schools,” Children 
and Schools 31, no. 2 (2009): 79–86. 
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gains significance when considered in terms of conscience, where the public 
and private are interrelated. As the development of conscience involves 
becoming familiar with the practices of a community as well as their 
justifications and problems, it is a public endeavor that serves largely public 
ends and provides the individual with the know how to live comfortably within 
the society.  
At the same time, developing conscience entails honing skills of 
perception and judgment about one’s community and one’s position within it, a 
private matter of reflection but one which, when acted upon, can have 
significant public impact. In the case of HB 542, the individual beliefs of the 
parent are prioritized over the child’s development of individual beliefs and 
public critique. The law enables parents to safeguard their selected vision of the 
good life at the expense of the child’s ability to learn about multiple and 
conflicting visions and, perhaps more importantly, to learn how to appraise the 
dominant views of one’s own family or community.24 
Additionally, when parents opt out of curriculum via HB 542 they 
evade public life as represented in the democratically constructed curriculum. 
Moreover, by removing their child from the classroom, they miss the 
opportunity to strengthen their communities; for if the curricular material is 
truly wrong or unjust, parents should be concerned about all children being 
exposed to it. They should work to challenge the use of the material through the 
public political process, including speaking out at school board meetings, 
raising awareness about perceived problems, and gathering coalitions of 
parents with similar concerns.25 Rather than jeopardize the public wellbeing by 
opting individuals out as a supposed matter of conscience, these approaches 
engage democracy, enact conscience, and protect public schools from excessive 
demands for individual alternatives and litigation. 
Educating Conscience 
When the relational nature of conscience is emphasized, and its role in 
sustaining and improving the public good is appreciated, one sees that 
conscience should be nurtured in schools. Through education, the norms of 
one’s community and skills of judgment that compose conscience take shape. 
Conscience is developed and strengthened in moments of debate, deliberation, 
and exposure to new ideas. Green describes good education this way: 
                                                
24 For more discussion of if and when the rights of the child should trump those of the 
parents or the state, see James Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights (Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
25 Admittedly, HB 542 was itself the result of political action, action that was 
spearheaded by parents angered by their children reading Nickel and Dimed. But the 
type of political recourse they sought is problematic insofar as it promotes the type of 
isolation that I argue against here. 
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The aim is not to calm the quarrels of conscience, but to 
encourage their enlargement and their elaboration. The aim 
must be to make those quarrels more incisive, more rational, 
more passionate, more perceptive, more discerning, and more 
expansive in their scope than is likely to result from any 
education by chance, drawing neither upon the voice of 
reason nor upon the practices of custom and tradition.26  
Hence education for the development of conscience is a careful and intentional 
endeavor that may sometimes engage controversial topics and heated debate. 
Given that education laws like HB 542 might encourage teachers to avoid 
controversial topics and the debates they raise, and because parents may 
prevent their children from being exposed to new or contrasting ideas, the bill 
may actually limit the development of conscience.  
Clearly, however, schools are already tasked with significant 
obligations that many struggle to meet: from more minor aspects of inculcating 
good character to more major expectations of demonstrating mastery of key 
subjects. Parents may rightly be skeptical that the type of rich and robust 
education for conscience that I describe here is actually occurring or even that 
it could possibly occur. Indeed, it is a lofty goal. But I would encourage such 
skeptical parents that, rather than first removing their child from what may be 
poor or missing conscience education, they inquire into the classroom process, 
identify ways they can support excellent teaching of debate and deliberation, 
locate stakeholders in the community with views similar to and different from 
their own to contribute their resources to the classroom conversations, and to 
take part in other supportive ways. If, after these efforts, teaching is still subpar 
or morally problematic, parents may then be better justified in removing their 
children from the classroom on the grounds of conscience, especially if they are 
able to provide alternative settings that better develop conscience, which may 
include community clubs, religious organizations, or other groups. 
Some parents, even those who invoke HB 542, may argue that schools 
should merely tell children that conscience is important and all Americans are 
entitled to freely exercise their own. However, this approach does not go far 
enough, for it cannot sufficiently overcome the teaching of parents who insist 
that their child learn only one “right” way to live. Nor are those parents’ 
children likely to appreciate that the consciences of others are of equal value to 
their own.27 Children need to see how others live, to see the humanity in it, in 
order to come to value the freedoms of conscience. Removing children from 
moments when these difficult matters play out in classrooms further prevents 
them from coming to respect the liberty of conscience for all people in public 
spaces. 
                                                
26 Green, Voices, 61. 
27 Rosemary C. Salomone, Visions of Schooling: Conscience, Community, and Common 
Education (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 333. 




HB 542 may seem to some to be an unique and atypical law, but it is 
aligned with legislation and Republican political platforms being introduced 
across the country, each aiming to protect the views of parents and to increase 
their choice and oversight of schools.28 To critique these bills and to guard 
against their negative ramifications on our schools, philosophers of education 
can aid in defining key terms like conscience, revealing its public dimension 
and its role in the health of individuals and society. Moreover, we need to make 




                                                
28 One example is the Republican platform released in Texas in 2012, which states the 
party’s opposition to the teaching of critical thinking skills that “have the purpose of 
challenging the student’s fixed beliefs and undermining parental authority.” Republican 
Party of Texas, “2012 State Republican Party Platform,” 12, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/texasgop_pre/assets/original/2012Platform_Final.pdf. 
 
